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Introduction	  
 
Turks represent the single largest ethnic minority in Germany. In 2013, people with a 
Turkish immigration background accounted for 17.6 percent of all persons in Germany with an 
immigration background (Statistiches Bundesamt). Much of Germany’s current integration 
policies have been implicitly designed with the Turkish population – frequently accused in the 
media of being “unwilling to integrate” in mind. The Turkish population also shares some 
important similarities that make them at least broadly comparable to today’s asylum seekers, 
many of which come from majority-Muslim so-called third-countries (non-EU members). As 
Germany’s immigration and asylum policies vary significantly depending on EU membership, 
this is not without consequence. Finally, Turks are considered to be the least well-integrated 
minority group in Germany.  
History	  of	  the	  Turkish	  Population	  in	  Germany	  
 
The first substantial influx of Turkish immigrants to Germany came as guest workers 
under an agreement between Turkey and the German Democratic Republic. In the wake of 
World War II, West Germany undertook a massive rebuilding effort. Faced with labor shortages, 
which were dramatically exacerbated by the erection of the Berlin Wall, the government looked 
first to their European peers including Portugal and Italy and eventually to third (non-European) 
countries including Turkey. West Germany concluded an agreement with Turkey in 1961. Guest 
workers, hailing primarily from poor, rural regions of Anatolia came to work in unskilled and 
semi-skilled positions throughout West Berlin. Confined to living in worker dorms or, in the case 
of Berlin, run-down sections of the city slated for urban renewal, guest workers were 
marginalized and faced discrimination. As temporary workers were expected to go home after a 
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few years, the government made no provisions for guest workers to learn German or help them 
adapt to life in Germany in any other substantial way. See undercover investigative reporter 
Gunter Walrath’s The Lowest of the Low for an expose on some of the conditions they faced. 
Furthermore, Germany had long conceived of itself as a nation in which citizenship was tied 
directly to ethnicity. One could not become German; they could only be born that way. By 
default, then, Germany did not consider itself a country of immigration and guest workers had no 
path to citizenship.  
Coinciding with the world oil crisis in 1973, demand for labor plummeted and the 
government terminated the guest worker program abruptly. But because 1973 was also a 
politically and economically unstable time in Turkey, and because guest workers who left 
Germany feared they would be unable to return, many rather than going home, instead brought 
their families to Germany via family reunification policies (Wilpert 2008). While the 
government began to provide incentives for leaving in 1983 which up to 250,000 Turks took 
advantage of, the Turkish population nonetheless continued to grow as a result of continued 
family reunification, which was permitted with few restrictions, and births (Yaşar 2013, 5). Only 
3 in 10 Turkish guest workers ever returned home (Hinze 2013, 7).  Nevertheless, German 
policymakers remained insistent that Germany was not a country of immigration. Today, in 
significant part a legacy of the guest worker program, over one-fifth of the German population 
has an immigrant background. Of this one-fifth, Turks represent the largest group. In 2011 Turks 
represented approximately 20% of all people with an immigration background. In Berlin the 
figure was 26.5% meaning that more than 1 of every 4 people with an immigration background 
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in Berlin has a Turkish immigration background.1 In raw numbers, there are approximately 3 
million residents of Germany with a Turkish immigration background and, according to the 2012 
census, approximately 200,000 in Berlin (Census). Furthermore, 500,000 of the 3 million Turks 
in Germany were born there. 
Socioeconomic	  Status	  of	  the	  Turkish	  Population	  in	  Germany	  
 
  While it is certainly not hard to find success stories in the Turkish population in Berlin 
and Germany, empirically the population is still severely disadvantaged by most measures, 
including employment, income, and educational outcomes. What is more concerning is that they 
are disadvantaged even compared to other immigrant groups. In 2007, unemployment rates for 
those with an immigration background in Germany were 11.7 percentage points greater than the 
native German population. However, for people with a Turkish immigration background these 
rates were even higher. Working with a dataset spanning from 1988-2006, Hohne and Koopmans 
found that among immigrant populations, labor market integration is lowest for Turkish migrants 
(2010, 4). This is despite being one of the oldest immigrant groups in Germany.  
In 2005, Germany made its first concerted efforts to address these problems.  For the first 
time in its history obliquely acknowledging that Germany had become a country of immigration, 
it enshrined the responsibility to integrate foreign populations in federal law and began preparing 
a first-of-its-kind national integration plan.  
                                                
1 It should be noted that much of what is officially considered the Turkish population in 
Germany and Berlin are ethnic Kurds who migrated from Turkey. Official German census 
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Germany’s	  Policy	  Response:	  Integration	  Policy	  
 
The German policy response to the socioeconomic disadvantage of migrant populations 
has been, broadly speaking, to increase integration efforts. What is Integration? According to 
Rinus Penninx of the Migration Policy Institute, “Integration is the process by which immigrants 
become accepted into society, both as individuals and as groups.” He continues, “this definition 
of integration is deliberately left open, because the particular requirements for acceptance by a 
receiving society vary greatly from country to country” (2003, 6). Academics and policymakers 
typically evaluate the content of integration policies by situating them between two poles, with 
multiculturalism on one end and assimilation on the other. Whereas multiculturalism policies 
encourage and promote the retention of cultural traits of the immigrant population within the host 
culture, assimilation policies call for immigrants to adopt the cultural traits and values of the host 
society. Patrick Simon writes, “Whereas countries that have adopted multiculturalism treat 
multiple national or ethnic identities as positive marks of a diverse heritage (e.g. Canada, the 
United States, Australia, the United Kingdom), assimilationist countries, with France in the lead, 
tend to insist on exclusive choices and consider the retention of an ethnic identity to be a sign of 
incomplete assimilation” (2012, 3). 
What	  is	  Germany’s	  Integration	  Policy?	  	  
 
Germany’s integration policies are premised on a classical understanding of integration, 
in which a migrant population gains social acceptance and socioeconomic mobility in the 
receiving society by adapting to the norms and values of the host culture. Such an understanding 
implies that if Turkish and other minority groups de-siloed from their ethnic enclaves, adopted 
German values and became more German and less Turkish, their economic and social problems 
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would go away. Fournier and Yurdakul write, “Many German state authorities argue that high 
levels of unemployment and low levels of educational achievement are related to immigrant 
incorporation. That is, in their view, once immigrants are better integrated into the German 
society, the problems of unemployment and educational achievement will automatically be 
solved” (2006, 175). To summarize, Germany’s integration policy by and large views culture as 
the vehicle by which to resolve the socioeconomic obstacles facing the country’s minorities.  
This orientation is reflected in an Integration policy, which focuses on “soft” factors such as 
social cohesion, encouraging interaction with ethnic Germans, and language acquisition. This 
soft approach is reflected in the Commission for Integration’s definition of successful integration 
as, “feeling part of a community and developing a common understanding of how to live 
together in society” (“Integration”).  Programs range from the federally sponsored integration 
courses, which teach German language and civic values to smaller local initiatives carried out by 
a wide array of local and regional government institutions and civil society actors. This policy is 
in contrast to other countries such as USA and Canada where rather than transmitting to 
newcomers a body of culture and values through top-down programs, government instead 
promotes “passive” acculturation to the host society by focusing its efforts on guaranteeing equal 
access to mainstream institutions, thereby “smoothing” the acculturation process.  
Rather than viewing upward socioeconomic mobility as the path to a passive integration for 
migrant populations, German policy instead views active integration as the path to 
socioeconomic mobility.  
Why	  Integration	  Policy?	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While it is true that the Turkish population is empirically disadvantaged, German 
policymakers decision to attack these problems through integration are heavily influenced by 
public and media coverage of immigrant communities. While the socioeconomic plight of 
immigrant communities in Germany has been a topic of public debate for decades, especially 
since 2001 the issue has come to be discussed in the media in terms of  “social problem” and 
“parallel societies” narratives. These accounts are typically sensationalized and rely heavily on 
stereotypes. In one infamous incident that came to symbolize the intractable social problems in 
immigrant communities, teachers at the Rutli school in Neukolln, whose student body was 
predominantly from an immigration background, demanded the school be shut down, citing fears 
for their safety and the delinquent behavior of the students. This problem is especially acute for 
coverage of Muslim immigrant populations, who are often portrayed as highly conservative, 
Islamist, and patriarchal. According to a government study of Muslim life in Germany, the 
percentage of Muslims in Germany who “do not have and do not wish to have” day-to-day 
contacts with Germans is no more than one percent. Unfortunately, a portion of the population 
does buy into these stereotypes. In 2010, Thilo Sarrazin, a politician from the left-leaning SPD 
party published what became the best-selling book of the year, Germany Does Away with Itself 
in which he argues among other things that Muslims are less intelligent than Germans and prefer 
to collect welfare rather than work (Foroutan 2013, 5). While official integration policy stresses 
that both the immigrant populations and the host society have a role in the integration process, if 
Sarrazin’s book sales are any indication, a not insignificant portion of the ethnically German 
population sees the issues of Integration from a much more one-sided perspective. Muslims in 
Germany (the vast majority of which have Turkish migration backgrounds), must become 
civilized.  
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Research	  Question	  
 
How does German policy try to address the socioeconomic disadvantages of immigrant 
groups, particularly the Turkish population, and how has it succeeded and failed?  
Methods	  
 
The basic details of the Turkish population in Berlin and Germany have been fairly well 
documented through statistics and other empirical measures, some of which were outlined above. 
The goal of this project was not to rehash these facts and figures but instead to fill in the gaps left 
by a strictly quantitative approach with qualitative details: to use ethnographic and qualitative 
data to both deepen and complicate the broader picture painted by the quantitative data. Thus the 
findings made here are intended to complement more empirical and comprehensive research 
carried out by academics and high-level research institutions. While all the observations and 
primary data collected here is perforce anecdotal, the findings in many instances coincide with 
the existing body of research. My own primary research was heavily supplemented by a large 
body of secondary literature in fields from immigration studies to economic sociology to 
anthropology. Due to the difficulty accessing detailed demographic data broken down by specific 
migration background from the federal government, I have had to rely on secondary data 
compiled by academics who have themselves gained access to the data. As a result I have 
sometimes had to settle for statistical measures that, while they can do a fine job illustrating the 
general socioeconomic position of Turks in Germany, are nevertheless not always as detailed or 
specific as would be ideal.  
My research consisted of primarily short-informal surveys and longer, semi-structured 
interviews. Shorter interviews were structured around a short-form survey focused primarily on 
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current and past employment history. Longer interviews ranged from forty-five minutes to an 
hour and questions were formulated based on the interviewee’s job or area of expertise. 
Generally speaking, questions pertained to the interview subjects’ perceptions of employment 
obstacles in Berlin. 
There were two groups of interview subjects. The first group consisted of the very broad 
category of Turkish employers and employees. The second group consisted of key informants – 
Employees of NGOs, local neighborhood associations, Turkish hometown associations, or other 
people who in a professional or other capacity had special insight into the questions I was 
seeking to answer. There was often overlap between the two groups. For instance, if key 
informants were Turkish, as they often were, we usually discussed both their personal and 
professional perspectives during the interview. Key informants were located largely via Internet 
research and cold-called or e-mailed with an interview request.  
Most contacts were made informally by “deep hanging” out at local Turkish 
establishments. A handful of interviews were also secured through the help of a Turkish tandem 
partner, (a Turkish PhD student working to improve his English). I also spoke with Turkish 
friends and acquaintances that I made in other capacities (for instance, my Turkish language 
instructor). As a result of the “deep hanging out” method, a significant portion of my respondents 
came from people who lived within my own neighborhood.  
Another problem was that despite efforts, most interview and survey respondents of 
Turkish employers or employees came from one of the three predominantly Turkish areas of 
Berlin. While these neighborhoods still feature high concentrations of Turkish residents, in 
recent years due to gentrification and for a variety of other factors, many Turkish people live in 
other areas of Berlin without significant ethnic Turkish populations. Although Wedding is one of 
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the three main Turkish enclaves in Berlin, it is in many ways socio-economically and 
demographically different from Berlin’s other neighborhoods, including the two other Turkish 
districts. Early in my stay when still looking for a more permanent accommodation, multiple 
German-Turks warned me not to stay in Wedding – that it was dangerous and that the Turkish 
people there were a little “funny.” Though I’m not quite sure what to make of this, it does 
suggest that in some way or other, Wedding may somehow be qualitatively unlike Neukolln or 
Kreuzberg, the two other predominantly Turkish areas in Berlin. Thus this could have influenced 
my findings. 
All interviews were conducted either in Turkish or English. My inability to speak 
German was an obvious obstacle and in some cases, surprisingly, an asset. In some cases, I 
suspect that interviewees were in fact more willing to speak with me when they learned I was not 
German. A clearly non-Turkish white male who spoke no German but halting Turkish was often 
found to be something of a curiosity, and this sometimes worked in my favor. In several 
instances it generated enough curiosity to lead to an extended conversation.  
Findings	  
Finding 1: Ethnic networks, which Integration Policy implicitly views as a source of 
dysfunction, are not in and of themselves the cause of Turks’ socioeconomic disadvantage.  
Conventional narratives implicitly define the socioeconomic disadvantage of immigrant 
populations, and the Turkish population in particular, as the result of a failure to integrate into 
the host society. Turkish migrants, rejecting German society and its values and seeking to 
preserve their own, intentionally remain apart from German society. Perhaps the greatest symbol 
of this irreconcilable divide in popular narratives is the headscarf. As the anthropologist Ruth 
Mandel writes, “the headscarf has become a fetishistic signifier of Turkish intractability. This 
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overdetermined symbol has been associated with the Turkish patriarchal oppression of women, 
an unwillingness to integrate and adopt German modernity, and a persistent Islamic presence 
(Mandel 2008, 11). In closing themselves off from Germans culturally and socially, the narrative 
holds, Turks also close themselves to economic mobility. Many of these same uninterrogated 
assumptions find themselves enshrined in Official Integration Policy, which espouses a social 
cohesion approach to Integration focused on addressing socioeconomic deficits by increasing 
interethnic contact.  
In an effort to roughly gauge the relationship between Turks’ economic well being and 
their level of interaction with ethnic Germans, I asked a number of Turks where they learned 
about their current and past jobs. Of my interviews, a large percentage of people reported 
learning about jobs through friends or family members. Of those people, a significant percentage 
of those contacts were Turkish. I observed that despite evidence of employment networks that 
were predominantly ethnically homogenous, these networks nevertheless did facilitate Turks 
helping each other find work. More concretely, in my interviews, ethnic networks were an 
important source of information about jobs for all but those with the highest educational 
credentials, and especially for those without any educational credentials working in the low-skill 
economy. In contrast to parallel society narratives that portray mono-ethnic social networks as a 
source of dysfunction, these networks instead seem to function more like coping mechanisms for 
Turks whose upward mobility is blocked by a lack of educational credentials. Turkish people are 
finding jobs without going outside their own enclave, but largely because they are not qualified 
for any jobs in the mainstream labor market. At least anecdotally, we could speculate that lack of 
interaction with the host culture, at least in the job search, does not in itself foreclose better 
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opportunities outside of the ethnic community but happens because of a lack of better 
opportunities in the broader society.  
The case of Ali2 illustrates how Turkish social networks help new members of the 
Turkish community get by. Having recently arrived on a Family Reunification visa after 
marrying a distant relative from his hometown on the Black Sea coast3, Ali joined her and their 
newborn in Berlin. Through a Turkish friend of his wife’s, he quickly found a job in a small 
Turkish-run barbershop in Wedding. With another baby on the way, on the weekends, he works a 
fast food job he found through another Turkish contact for extra money. He does not currently 
speak any German and is enrolled in the national integration course to learn. With only a high 
school education in Turkey and no command of German yet, the ethnic networks that helped him 
find these jobs will allow him to earn an income while he learns German. He works many hours 
and it will be a lengthy path toward German fluency, at which point he will still lack a 
recognized work credential. Although he was licensed as a barber in Turkey, his certification will 
not be recognized here for technical reasons. Nevertheless, given his lack of language skills, 
without the low-paid work he has now, he would likely be unemployable and almost 
immediately dependent on the state. Furthermore, though the owner of the barbershop where he 
works is Turkish and they speak Turkish to most customers, the shop also has ethnically German 
clients, and he will likely have some opportunities to pick up some German vocabulary and 
phrases related to his profession along the way. While he faces no short-term prospect of upward 
mobility, given Ali’s relatively limited prospects at the moment, this arrangement provides 
much-needed income and social contact. A popular parallel society narrative would suggest that 
Ali, because he is surrounded by fellow Turks now, will never successfully learn German and 
                                                
2 All the interviewees’ names were changed. 
3 This is a very common arrangement.  
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continue to live only among Turks. However, what is the alternative? His Turkish network in 
Berlin allows him to work as opposed to remaining unemployed, which would almost certainly 
be the only alternative given his lack of language skills. While we cannot know what Ali’s future 
will hold, a more likely obstacle to his upward mobility will not be his Turkish culture, but his 
lack of a professional credential that is recognized in Germany. Ali explained to me that while he 
was licensed as a men’s barber in Turkey, professional regulations in Germany requires barbers 
to be trained to cut both men and women’s hair. Thus he would be required to retrain in Berlin 
(and in a language he does not speak). Doing so would not be cheap and, given his heavy work 
schedule, would likely cut into his income in addition.     
While Ali’s trajectory remains to be seen, Mehmet, who came to Berlin fifteen years ago, 
also via a Family Reunification Visa, followed a narrative quite similar to Ali’s in the beginning. 
Fifteen years later, however, he is, by the standards of German integration policy, well integrated 
into society. Though he relied on an exclusively Turkish support network of friends, neighbors, 
and family members to get started, he now speaks fluent German, is married to a German 
woman, and lives in an unremarkable neighborhood without many other Turks. However, his 
Turkish network continues to play a central role in social life. Later, when we met for an 
interview in the Kottbusser Tor area, known as “Little Istanbul” he greeted several Turkish 
friends and acquaintances in a matter of moments. Thus despite his successful integration into 
German society, his Turkish network remains strong, and he reported finding his last job through 
a Turkish-speaking work acquaintance. Thus, his Turkish network continues to serve an 
important social and economic function for him. 
Beyond leading each other to employment opportunities, I observed in passing many 
instances of the way Turkish people in Berlin help each other in a variety of small but significant 
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ways. One of the most common informal ways of helping I observed is the practice of “visiting,” 
which serves as an informal source of aid, especially for ethnic entrepreneurs. I observed 
countless examples of Turks stopping in to their friend’s shop, having a tea, and doing them an 
impromptu favor such as going to the store for them, carrying supplies downstairs into the 
kitchen, or manning the cash register for a few minutes while the owner went to run an errand.  
Finally, these mutual aid networks were seen not only as a way to get by but also in some cases, 
as an alternative to receiving support from the state, which was generally viewed negatively. 
Indeed, although popular narratives, including Thilo Sarazzin’s, accuse Turks of being heavily 
welfare-dependent, among some of those I spoke to, particularly more recent arrivals to 
Germany, there was a deep antipathy toward collecting welfare benefits from the State, with 
some bristling at the mere idea. In a qualitative study of support networks, Bilecen also made a 
similar finding. Among her twenty ethnically Turkish interviewees, she writes, “Even if they are 
entitled to unemployment benefits, they prefer to seek employment based on the information 
they receive through interpersonal networks, treating formal protection options as a last resort” 
(Bilecen 2005, 248). This was further reaffirmed during an interview with Quartiersmangement 
officer in Wedding. Speaking to Busra, the manager of the Wedding Quartiersmanagement office 
and herself the child of Turkish guest workers, she said, “When Turkish people have a problem 
they know who to go to and what to do to get it solved. They have their own way of doing 
things.” Do many Turks in Berlin rely on strong informal networks because of a strong cultural 
desire for self-sufficiency, or instead because of an adversarial feeling toward state institutions? 
These are questions for further exploration. Furthermore, the Turks I spoke to who were born in 
Germany seemed more comfortable with availing themselves of the services of the Arbeitsamt 
and the Job Center when necessary. From this we could speculate that some Turks’ aversion to 
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these institutions may owe something to their unfamiliarity with these institutions. They could be 
intimidated by the complicated bureaucracy, for instance, or uncertainty over whether they are 
legally entitled to the services offered. One could in this vein envision a negative situation in 
which Turks’ collective fear or unwillingness to avail themselves of resources they are entitled to 
such as training courses and unemployment benefits keeps them from taking advantage of 
government-sponsored opportunities for retraining, for instance. However, it must be stressed 
that the actual significance of, and extent to which Turks avoid formal institutions such as the 
Job Center, which administers long-term unemployment benefits, is not clear. German privacy 
laws make it very difficult to attain long-term unemployment statistics segmented by specific 
migration background.   
To conclude, while ethnic networks play a role in Turkish communities in Berlin and 
certainly throughout Germany, popular narratives that seek to demonize these networks and 
blame them for Turks’ socioeconomic disadvantage should be questioned. Especially in the case 
of new arrivals from Turkey, they seem to provide critical social and economic support. Strong 
ethnically homogenous social networks can help Turks cope with temporary or permanent 
blocked labor market mobility. Finally, they appear more likely to be a response to blocked 
socioeconomic mobility than a cause of it. 
FINDING 2: Germany’s flexibilized labor system exacerbates the disadvantage of those 
without credentials.  
Berlin’s economy follows a narrative similar to rust belt economies in America. With the 
decline of industry, the economy shifted from a large base of fairly secure manufacturing jobs to 
a two-tiered division of jobs: low-skilled and low paid service sector jobs and high-skilled 
knowledge-economy jobs. Guest workers were hardest hit by restructuring. Wilpert cites that 
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during this economic restructuring, “foreigners accounted for about 45 percent of the 
redundancies between 1974 and 1977 and over 50 percent between 1980 and 1982 (2008, 238).  
This statistic starkly illustrates the structural change in Germany’s economy and illustrates how 
migrants—those with low educational credentials and poor German skills—were left out.  
As discussed above, first-generation guest workers, with limited language skills and few 
educational credentials were ill prepared to find new places in the new economy.  
Having in many cases never learned German or imperfectly at best, these workers had an 
especially hard time finding a new place in the new service-oriented skills-based economy borne 
of global economic restructuring. Unqualified or at least considered unqualified for outward-
looking jobs in retail and other sectors, many turned to entrepreneurship in low-skilled 
industries, often out of a lack of viable alternatives.  As Wilpert writes, “economic restructuring 
transformed the labor market, reducing jobs in manufacturing and adding to jobs in services. 
This was accompanied by a growth in irregular, informal and precarious jobs as well as self-
employment (2008, 238).  On the other hand, many of those who lost their jobs in this period 
never did find a place in the new economy, and have become long-term unemployed.  
Beyond reduced and less stable wages, guest workers’ transition from working in middle-
class industrial jobs to working in the informal economy and low-wage service sectors had 
another important dynamic as well in that it in many cases severed Turks from more than just 
stable wages. It also severed them from political representation. Labor unions traditionally 
played a very strong role in Germany’s industrial sector and, as guest workers and non-citizens 
with no right to vote, guest workers found political representation through labor councils. 
However, service sectors are less likely to be unionized and are in many cases more difficult to 
unionize due to small firm sizes. Labor councils, which were well entrenched in the 
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manufacturing sector, are not always present in the retail sector. Unskilled Turks, once separated 
from their stable factory jobs, did not have the social or cultural capital to get back in.  “It is very 
difficult to get a job in one of these big companies without knowing someone. You have to be a 
MiKi or a KuKi” (colleague of a current employee or family member of a current employee) 
Rudolph, the IG Metall spokesman, told me.  
Although this is unfortunately a well-known story for the first generation of guest 
workers, more alarming is the impact it continues to have on newer generations. At the same 
time as the labor market has become segmented into stable and well-paying jobs and flexibilized 
low-income ones, the total number of unskilled jobs in general has, in the long run, declined 
continuously since the 1980s (Hohne and Koopmans 2015, 10) further squeezing those who 
depend on them to earn a living. Across Germany, the overall percentage of blue-collar workers 
decreased from 48.8 per cent in 1950 to 30.2 per cent in 2002, and the number of white-collar 
employees rose from 16.5 per cent to 51.8 per cent in the same period” (Bendel 2014). As a 
result, as in the U.S., the stakes of education have increased.  
Young people with credentials are also underemployed and working in fields outside of 
their specialization. Speaking with a number of young Turkish-Germans, the general feeling was 
that while Berlin may not be a difficult place to find a job, it is a difficult place to find a good 
job. It is also a difficult place to find consistent and stable work. Ayşe’s story provides some 
insight into one of the reasons why: the growth of contract work that allows employers to hire 
workers for shorter periods of time without committing to traditional full-time jobs and the 
additional benefits and protections afforded by them. In an attempt to make the labor market 
more attractive to employers, the German government introduced several reforms that make 
work more tenuous. Employers are allowed to hire workers on a contract basis. After two years, 
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employers must pay increased benefits. In practice, my interviews suggest that contracts often go 
unrenewed for no particular reason. For those workers, including those with educational 
credentials, who have not been able to land a coveted white-collar job and the stability it brings, 
moving from job to job is a common theme, which brings with it not only instability but also less 
potential to secure higher wages over the long-run. Furthermore, there is evidence that migrants 
from non-EU countries are more likely to be temporarily employed (Kogan 2011, 280). 
I met 29-year old Ayşe while she was working as a secretary for a Turkish firm that helps 
Turkish citizens who have previously worked in Germany claim their retirement benefits. 
Despite a degree in economics from a respected university in Berlin, she described working a 
series of unskilled retail jobs, the most recent of which, with international fashion retailer Zara, 
ended because her contract was not renewed after two years, the point at which the firms are 
required to convert the job into a full-time, non-contract job with the greater benefits and security 
such a job affords. Ayşe’s experience at Zara underscores the differences between traditional 
jobs and flexibilized contract work in the German economy. While she worked at Zara she 
organized a workers’ council4, which represents workers at the local level. While workers’ 
councils are legally protected once created, they do not exist automatically and instead must be 
organized. Most firms do not want them for obvious reasons. No doubt in large part as a result of 
Ayşe’s organizing efforts within her company, her contract was not renewed and thus, in her 
attempts to win better working conditions, she found herself out of a job. Today, as a secretary, 
she feels overqualified and underpaid and is actively looking for a new job. At 29, despite a 
college degree from a respected university, she continues to move from entry-level job to entry-
level job, starting at the bottom with each new position. 
                                                
4 Shop-floor organization representing workers at the local level. While they are not labor unions 
they are usually closely affiliated with labor unions. 
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Another young interviewee, Taylan, also illustrates the less easily quantifiable negative 
aspects of the current labor market: underemployment is common and many people are 
employed in jobs outside of their desired field. Taylan, who aspires to be a kindergarten teacher, 
was lucky to find an apprenticeship, but it is in a field he has no interest in. He complains that “It 
is very difficult to find a good job in Berlin these days. “While steadily employed in a 
supermarket, he complains about frequent disagreements and arguments with his boss, who he 
declares a racist. However, by purely empirical standards, Taylan might be considered lucky. For 
many migrants and Germans in general, finding apprenticeships in Germany’s well-respected 
dual-education system is notoriously difficult. According to Rudolph, a union spokesman for IG 
Metall, this is partly due also to economic conditions. “Companies don’t want to train people 
anymore. It is too expensive and the investment is too great. They say they can hire workers 
already qualified from other countries.” Indeed, one of the major roles played by this union and 
another one I spoke to is to push their respective industries to take on more apprentices.  
Another significant obstacle to mainstream labor market access for Turks in Germany is 
labor market discrimination. Perceptions of workforce discrimination were not uncommon 
among those I spoke with. One story went as follows: My brother has a very dark skin tone. He 
doesn’t look Turkish and he has an unusual name. We are both sure that they thought he was 
Pakistani or something. If they thought he was Turkish, they never would have hired him!” The 
story underscores that Turks in particular are stigmatized. Ozan, a middle-aged office worker and 
SPD activist, told me, “You can write a perfect resume in perfect German, but as soon as they 
see you in person, it’s over.” However representative these responses are, they do speak to the 
perceptions some Turks–including this educated and politically engaged individual –have about 
how the host society thinks of them. In fact, though, empirically these perceptions are borne out. 
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According to a study by Jutta Hohne, those with a migration background and Turks especially 
across all levels of qualification were much less likely to be employed (Hohne and Buschoff, 
2015).  
A general ignorance of Turkish culture and diversity in Germany may contribute to 
discrimination in the labor market and other institutions. Popular conceptions of Turks in 
Germany depend on an anachronistic image of the Turkish population that frames most Turks as 
extremely religious, conservative, and patriarchal and who routinely engage in honor killings and 
forced marriages. This is probably due in part to the fact that a significant portion of the first 
generation guest workers were indeed conservative and rural. However, three generations later, 
the Turkish community is highly heterogeneous, comprising several religious sects and political 
orientations. Additionally, since the guest worker era, and especially in the 1990s many ethnic 
Turks came as asylum seekers. Today more Turks are leaving Germany than coming, and the 
most who are coming today are students from middle-class urban families and highly skilled 
workers. Yet these significant differences are often elided and the Turkish population in 
Germany is reduced to a symbol of poverty, welfare dependence, and backwardness. Although I 
did not speak to ethnic Germans directly about their perceptions of Turkish people, a few 
anecdotal experiences provide some evidence. Ozan perceived that Germans idea of Turks are 
anachronistic and rooted firmly in place. He remarked, “Many of the guest workers who first 
came here were villagers. They were poorly educated. Now no matter how well educated you 
are, to Germans, you are one of those villagers.” Pecoud makes a similar finding: “Socio-
economically successful immigrants…often complain that regardless of their socio-economic 
success, they lack proper recognition from Germans who are used to thinking of German-Turks 
as guest worker’ descendants doing guest workers jobs.” (2002, 502). Though it is difficult to 
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quantify the impact of this, it seems certain that this plays a role in discrimination. Hohne and 
Koopmans allude to the concept of imputed discrimination in which, “due to a lack of full 
information on the ‘true’ productivity of workers, potential employers impute group information 
instead.”  
The effect of this labor market discrimination can be devastating for minorities in a labor 
market like Europe’s. Europe’s labor market, where the route to social mobility are different than 
in the U.S., makes the consequences of this exclusion even more significant. “Continental 
Europe’s regulated system makes mobility through self-employment more difficult for 
immigrants: the ‘normal’ way of achieving socio-economic success in Europe is finding a well-
paid and well-protected job in the mainstream economy” (Pecoud 2002, 503). Such a system 
does not bode well for immigrants who face a high degree of discrimination. Anecdotally, Turks 
in Germany may have an understanding of this themselves. Despite living in a developed 
western European country with a generous welfare state, more than one doner shop employee I 
met dreamed of moving to the United States. Interest in the United States was noticeably less 
common among more economically successful Turks.   
FINDING 3: Residents with a Turkish immigration background still suffer from unequal 
access to the public education and training system and the labor market 
While I have tried to illustrate that German policy sees successful integration as the 
primary vehicle for socioeconomic mobility of migrant populations, many institutions which 
heavily influence the socioeconomic status of immigrant communities fall outside the purview of 
Integration Policy. While integration policies exist and are executed at multiple levels from local 
to federal, the majority of any German’s interactions with government, including those with an 
immigrant background, are through non-ethnically oriented, mainstream institutions and 
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bureaucracies, most notably the labor market and the education system. For instance, education, 
which falls outside the purview of official integration policy, is handled at the state level (by the 
16 federal states or lander) whereas welfare and unemployment policies are governed by federal 
policy (Bendel 2014, 5). Yet these institutions, especially the education system and the long-term 
unemployment system, present significant obstacles for immigrant populations that cannot be 
effectively addressed via integration policy alone.  
The structure of Berlin’s public education system inherently disadvantages immigrant 
groups by routing students into different tracks at a young age, typically at the age of 10. This 
system contributes to segregating students from a young age and often has the effect of 
concentrating children with an immigration background into slower-paced schools that do not 
lead to the credentials required to enter university or vocational training. Unlike the U.S. where 
all high school graduates receive one basic school leaving-certificate that, depending on their 
grades, makes them eligible for a four-year university, in Berlin and more or less every other 
German state, only a certain type of school, the gymnasium provides the high school-leaving 
certificate (the abitur) required for study at a traditional four-year university. Realschule falls 
somewhere in the middle, where it is possible to earn an abitur under some circumstances but 
typically students are prepared for future vocational education, and finally the hauptschule, 
where the weakest students are prepared for blue collar careers (Hinze 2013, 6). Statistically, 
students with migrant backgrounds are less likely to go to gymnasium and are concentrated in 
hauptschules. In 2009, for instance, the rates of students receiving the abitur with an 
immigration background was 14 compared to the German population average of 28 (Spiegel 
Online, 1/26/2009). According to Hinze, in the past it was not uncommon for children of guest 
workers—owing to their inability to speak German—to be put into classes for the mentally 
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disabled (2013, 65). Though these dark days are over, unequal educational outcomes persist. 
Many children of guest workers likely continue to be placed into lower educational tracks based 
on their lower German-language ability as a result of not speaking it in the home.  
Ayşe provided evidence of some other obstacles that the rigid education system can create. 
Tracked into a realschule at a young age, she graduated without an abitur and thus without the 
ability to pursue university studies. When she later decided she wanted to pursue her abitur at 
age 19, there was no easy path for her to do so. Her local high school was unwilling to accept her 
back due to her age and thus she found her only option was to attend a private school, a rare and 
unconventional path in Germany, but in her circumstances, the only way to gain the abitur. Ayşe 
was hard-working and determined to get the education she felt entitled to, but after graduating 
without an abitur, the school system is not set up to allow a second chance. Owing to the 
inflexibility of the school system, getting her abitur later required significant time and money out 
of her own pocket. Thus there may be other people in her position without her persistence or 
resources who give up and never get their abitur.   
However, earning an abitur and going to university is not the only option for young 
people. Germany should be commended for its strong dual-education system, which creates 
pathways for non-academically inclined students to train for stable jobs in the trades. However, 
Germany’s liberalized labor policies and the pressures of global competition mean that these jobs 
are not as plentiful as they used to be, for immigrant populations or anyone else. Furthermore, 
minorities and especially Turks are underrepresented in the dual education system. Ayşe, who 
with a leg up due to her abitur, reports applying to more than 100 traineeships with no success. 
As a result of a competitive labor market, even those with the abitur face stiff competition in 
gaining access to the vocational training system. Much like many jobs in the U.S. today require a 
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B.A. merely because they can, in Germany large firms prefer to take on trainees who have an 
abitur but either never went to or never finished university, thus creating a competitive 
environment for those without the abitur.  
Finding 4: Focusing on culturally oriented assimilation policies rather than mainstreamed 
policies may encourage ethnicisation or reactive-identity formation.  
 As discussed above, German policy implicitly views the socioeconomic disadvantage of 
the Turkish population to be the product of poor integration into the host society and the Turkish 
community’s self-isolation. As a result, it places strong emphasis on integration as a path toward 
solving these socioeconomic deficits. However, the top-down, assimilation oriented manner in 
which it pursues these goals risks alienating the very populations which it seeks to integrate. By 
implicitly suggesting to the Turkish population that their cultural traits are to blame for their 
socioeconomic deficits, some Turks may come to see integration policies as pushing them to 
give up or abandon their Turkish identity. This is especially relevant for Turkish diaspora 
communities throughout Europe, which have been found to maintain strong ties with their 
country of origin. Based on studies in France and other European countries, Turks as a migrant 
group are more likely to maintain strong connections to their home country (Simon 2012).  
Turkish people in Germany, feeling that their cultural heritage is being judged negatively, 
may feel more strongly inclined to double down on their Turkishness. In his writing on the 
concept of Reactive Ethnicity Portes speaks of the role persecution, threats, and discrimination 
can play in the rise of a strong ethnic identity among a minority ethnic group (2001, 148). 
Whereas popular narratives often accuse Turks of purposefully isolating themselves from the 
host society in ethnic enclaves, this may in fact be a reaction to policies that continually remind 
Turks of, and ask them to minimize, their differences. Nevertheless, German policymakers have 
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not yet been willing to fully accept Turks’ desire to retain their cultural identity, viewing it as an 
obstacle to integration into German society. This approach is almost certainly doing more harm 
than good.  
Germany’s citizenship policies are one of the most visible examples of policies that 
potentially alienate rather than integrate Turks. Conservative-leaning German political parties 
have long been wary of allowing for dual citizenship for fear that it would hinder integration by 
allowing migrants to cling to their previous identities, at the expense of forming a new German 
identity (Hinze 2013, 6). Before 2000, children born to non-citizen parents in Germany had no 
clear path to citizenship. Starting in 2000, children born to third-country nationals in Germany 
received German citizenship automatically, but because dual citizenship was not permitted for 
third-countries, had to decide between keeping their German citizenship or Turkish Citizenship 
between the ages of 18 and 23. If they took no action, their German citizenship was 
automatically cancelled. Before then, the options for obtaining citizenship were more limited. In 
the meantime, non-German children born to EU or Swiss nationals in Germany were eligible for 
dual-citizenship and thus never had to make this choice. Finally, at the end of 2014, children 
born to third-country nationals in Germany after 1990 were allowed to retain dual citizenship. 
However, this option remains closed to those born before 1990, a sore spot for many in the 
Turkish community. These kinds of restrictive citizenship policies also may backfire by 
producing stronger Turkish ethnic identity formation. The requirement, until 2014, to choose 
between German and Turkish citizenship, for youth especially created strong potential for 
reactive identity formation by forcing Turkish-Germans to choose between Germany and 
Turkey. 
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Although conventional wisdom holds that maintaining another citizenship would prevent 
building loyalty toward your new country, in reality in many cases it may have the opposite 
effect, causing Turkish people to resent the country which was forcing such a choice on them. 
Renouncing one’s Turkish citizenship in order to hold on to German citizenship would be, in 
some senses to forsake your “true” heritage and people for citizenship in a country where many 
Turks feel, regardless of their legal status, they will never be accepted as a full member of 
society. The complexity of this issue is further compounded by mixed messages young people 
with a Turkish immigration background receive from various outlets. For instance, Turkey’s 
current president famously called assimilation a “crime against humanity.” While allowing for 
dual citizenship starting in 2014 is a crucial step in the right direction, it does not solve the 
problem at a single stroke. The reform does not benefit the 1st and 2nd generations Turks who still 
have no path to dual-citizenship. Furthermore, negative perceptions of the host society already 
formed as a result of these policies may not be quickly forgotten despite positive reforms. As 
Mandel writes, “The frustration and humiliation inherent in restrictive visa regimes, traumas of 
denied family reunion, and different sets of rights for resident aliens will be with us for some 
time.” (2008, 15). Integration is a complicated social and sociological process with a long 
memory. In a country that as late as the 1990s politicians continued to insist was resolutely “not 
a country of immigration” and was very open and proactive about its desire to send back as many 
guest workers as possible, Turkish people have understandably felt unwanted and unwelcome. 
Indeed, until 2005, they were officially unwanted, and today, in the eyes of some citizens, they 
still are. Almost half of all Germans queried in a 2008 survey said there are too many Muslims 
living in Germany and more than half said that Muslims living in Germany are too demanding 
(Foroutan 2013, 6). Thus, however sharply policymakers may change tack (though thus far 
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changes have been extremely incremental), they face an uphill battle in winning back the trust of 
a community they have long spurned. Furthermore, as I will discuss later, the argument that 
migrants cannot accept a new culture while maintaining ties to the old is increasingly untenable 
in the face of new academic research into acculturation processes.   
In other ways, too, German policy rhetoric continues to subtly send a message that Turks 
and migrants are to be tolerated rather than accepted as Germans. Germany’s policy rhetoric sets 
a tone that undermines its claims to tolerance by trying to justify the presence of migrant 
communities based on their economic contributions rather than their fundamental belonging. 
This may actually sends a less-than-welcoming message that non-ethnic Germans must earn 
their acceptance by contributing to GDP rather than living in Germany by right and as Germans. 
This is especially reflected in the rhetoric of Germany’s “world-openness” found throughout 
policy documents. “World-openness creates jobs.”  World-openness itself is posited as a concept 
that should be embraced for its economic impact and not merely because it is intrinsically good 
to accept others who are not exactly like you. Justifying the presence of minority groups 
primarily by pointing to their economic contributions indirectly sends a message that minorities 
should be tolerated for practical reasons rather than out of a fundamental imperative for humans 
to learn to live alongside and respect others who may not be like you. Even the language of 
academic research has come to valorize the economic potential of migrants, using terms such as 
“Diversity dividend” (Aytar and Rath 2011, 6). But justifying the acceptance of migrants into 
society on the basis of their potential economic contribution alone is morally bankrupt and 
unsustainable. There may not always be an economic justification. Furthermore, this may be 
sending a message to long-marginalized communities that the host society’s tolerance of them is 
dependent on their economic contributions. That ethnic Germans’ own acceptance as legitimate 
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members of society is not connected to their economic productivity but instead to their blood 
may provide justifications for Turks’ claims that they are treated as second-class citizens.  
Furthermore, such instrumentalized justifications for migrant populations also have more 
practical pitfalls. When the economy is bad, or whenever, they are susceptible to counter-
narratives of parasitism: migrants do not in fact contribute to the economy but instead prey on it. 
Mandel speaks of the terrorist acts carried out against Turkish and other minority population 
throughout the 1990s, when the economic troubles and high unemployment wrought by 
unification contributed to extreme right-wing violence (2008, 53). Today again, in the wake of 
new migration streams, right-wing attacks on immigrant shelters are on the rise. These attackers 
are unlikely to be appeased by, for instance, pointing out Germany’s diminishing population and 
its dire need for immigrants to bolster the labor force.  
 
Collectively, one could argue that these policies may produce or at least contributed to 
producing a distrust of the host society within the Turkish community that contributes to Turks 
generally avoiding formal avenues of participation, including participation in programs designed 
with integration in mind, as seen in the Quartiersmanagement case. According to Emre, a young 
Turkish-German who works for a local minority-oriented economic development NGO, one 
common problem the organization faces when reaching out to Turkish businesses to offer free 
consulting services is that ethnically Turkish business owners are deeply suspicious and suspect 
that rather than legitimately trying to help, company representatives may be covert investigators 
trying to catch Turkish entrepreneurs violating laws, such as paying workers under the table. In 
fact, Emre told me he was hired specifically because his Turkish immigration background makes 
it easier to approach Turkish business owners on behalf of the organization.  
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Another important shortcoming of policies that link immigrants’ assimilation to the host culture 
as the route to socioeconomic mobility and acceptance by the host society is that even if 
immigrant populations do what Integration policy prescribes, such as learning the German 
language and adopting German values, it is not a guarantee that the host citizens themselves will 
accept the immigrants, creating a situation where Turks may do their prescribed part but still not 
be fully accepted. Governments have little control over the actual reception of immigrants into 
society at a person-to-person level. They cannot force ethnic Germans to accept immigrants as 
their peers and equals, no matter how closely immigrant groups fulfill certain criteria outlined in 
the integration policy.  As Hinze points out, “even if they [immigrants] do abide by the rules of 
integration, general prejudices against certain minority groups may still exclude them from the 
national mainstream.” (2013, 19). Top-down integration policies make a promise to immigrant 
communities that the government cannot necessarily keep.  
Indeed, among some Turkish people I spoke with there was a sense that no matter what they did, 
or how economically successful they became, they would never be fully accepted as German by 
the host society. The sentiment was encapsulated succinctly by Ozan: “You can go out with 
Germans, have German friends, work with Germans, speak perfect German, and even feel 
German, but as long as your hair is black, none of that matters.” No matter what Turkish people 
do, their markers of otherness continue to persist in German culture because German society, 
while it may generally accept the presence of the Turks, has not yet come to accept them as 
fundamentally German. Top-down integration policies which emphasize the need for migrants to 
conform to an essential set of German values may contribute to reifying these supposed innate 
cultural differences and worsening the underlying socioeconomic problems.  
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Policy	  Recommendations	  	  
Promote integration through policies that increase economic inclusion rather than via soft 
cultural measures. 
Whereas dominant policy discourses imply that social exclusion causes socioeconomic 
disadvantage, it may be that socioeconomic disadvantage actually promotes and perpetuates 
social exclusion. These socioeconomic disadvantages should be addressed head on through 
policies that target the socioeconomic deficits directly rather than indirectly through integration 
policies, which run the risk of alienating immigrant populations by implicitly linking their 
disadvantages to the supposed shortcomings of their culture. Forcing ‘them’ to become like ‘us’ 
in the old-fashioned assimilative way is not only counterproductive, but it may also provoke a 
reethnicisiation...” (Entzinger 2006, 18). Treating social problems as “ethnic problems” further 
exacerbates difference and lack of belonging (Pecoud 2002, 503). The mere idea that there is a  
“Turkish problem” rather than a general socioeconomic problem continues to reify difference 
rather than promote acceptance.  
In the same vein, if socioeconomic disadvantage is acknowledged as the problem itself 
(as it should be) rather than the byproduct of failed assimilation, these disadvantages should be 
rectified through mainstream institutions, primarily via the education and labor systems, which 
fall outside the purview of official integration policy.  However, these systems themselves must 
be better adapted to suit the needs of a diverse population. Turkish-speaking employees should 
be a priority not only for institutions and initiatives directly related to or funded by Integration 
policy,  but also all state institutions, including the Arbeitsamt and Job Center where all Germans 
go for employment counseling and unemployment benefits regardless of migration background, 
and which relate to their socioeconomic issues directly rather than obliquely as in the case of 
Integration policy. 
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Embrace rather than discourage transnational citizenship and support and allow for 
acculturation to happen in a variety of ways. 
In addition to the negative responses assimilation-oriented integration policies can 
provoke in immigrant populations, these policies are also misguided for other reasons. They do 
not accurately reflect the reality of Germany’s multicultural makeup today nor do they reflect the 
most up-to-date understandings of the acculturation process by which migrants adopt to life in a 
new host society. Despite some token gestures toward multiculturalism, Germany’s integration 
policy is still premised on what is at its core an understanding of acculturation as a linear process 
of assimilation to the host society. Working in the American context, Portes shows that the 
traditional understanding of acculturation, in which immigrants gradually adopt the customs and 
values of the host culture, is only one of multiple patterns in which immigrants acculturate to a 
host society. For example, Portes finds that in the American context “immigrant youth who 
remain firmly ensconced in their respective ethnic communities, may, by virtue of this fact, have 
a better chance of educational and economic mobility through access to the resources that their 
communities make available.” (2001, 251). Portes describes the Punjabi immigrant community, 
an extremely successful migrant community in the U.S. who outperform natives in school. He 
writes, Punjabi parents pressured their children to avoid too much contact with white peers who 
may ‘dishonor’ the immigrants’ families and defined ‘becoming Americanized’ as forgetting 
one’s roots and adopting the most disparaged traits of the majority.” (2001, 251). Thus the 
Punjabi community in the U.S. has attained socio-economic mobility precisely by encouraging 
their children not to assimilate.  
Promote policies that capitalize on ethnic ties, rather than condemn them. 
Current integration policy tends to implicitly demonize ethnic bonds by linking failed 
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upward mobility to a failure to integrate with the majority society. The evidence for this is weak 
and narrowly applicable. As Patrick Simon points out in his assessment of similar failures in 
French integration policy, strong ethnic bonds do not necessarily ensure economic 
marginalization and preclude integration. Instead, they can actually be assets. He writes, “Being 
able to navigate among plural identities offers resources in our globalized societies, whereas 
assimilationist requirements create more stigmatization of ethnic minorities and undermine 
integration prospects” (Simon 2012, 1). By embracing a wider definition of integration that 
allows immigrants to forge a new transnational identity rather than give up their old one, 
policymakers could harness these social ties and incorporate them into policy interventions. My 
interviews and other secondary data have shown that social ties are valuable including, and 
sometimes especially, those ties rooted in ethnic solidarity. The strong bonds among ethnic 
Turks may provide a natural strategy or channel for economic development.  
Furthermore, the medium of integration policy is as important as the message. Not only the 
substance of Germany’s integration policy, but how it tries to implement its integration goals is 
itself critical. German integration policies must try to advance their goals in ways that appeal to 
the Turkish population and do not alienate them further. Despite media portrayals, Turkish 
immigrants I spoke to showed strong entrepreneurial inclinations and a desire to stand on their 
own feet. Furthermore, they see themselves and their own networks, rather than the government 
or wider community, as the way to solve their problems or find support. In this regard, local 
integration policy stands out as the ideal level for action. In this respect Germany and 
particularly Berlin is already doing many things right. For instance, integration policy at the local 
level relies heavily on the involvement of civil society organizations. There are numerous 
different organizations throughout Berlin that, with funding from state, local, and federal 
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governments as well as the European Union, offer subsidized consulting for aspiring and current 
ethnic entrepreneurs and other forms of aid. Programs like these, which help Turkish people help 
themselves and that align directly with their economic interests are more likely to attract their 
interest and gain their participation than policies that seek to encourage or valorize certain kinds 
of norms and behaviors, which are more likely to be seen as a challenge to their cultural heritage.  
However, these are only piecemeal programs that reach a comparatively small portion of the 
population with an immigrant background, compared to the critical importance of mainstream 
institutions, as discussed above. Although the education and labor system fall outside of official 
integration policy, they touch the lives of immigrants at a much larger scale than targeted 
integration programs. Greater efforts should be made to ensure Turks and other immigrant 
groups have equal access to those institutions. 
Live up to the two-way street promise by promoting intercultural citizenship. 
While Germany’s National Integration Plan holds that successful integration “is a two-
way street,” requiring the active engagement of both the immigrant population and the host 
society in the integration process, in practice the integration process as it plays out on a national 
level is rather one-sided. That Angela Merkel herself has on more than one occasion pronounced 
the “failure of multiculturalism” and harshly called for assimilation in public speeches 
underscores the gap between policy and reality. The official motto of the national integration 
policy “Promoting and Demanding” more subtly underscores the assimilation demand at the 
heart of the policy. Finally, the abandoned effort by a major political party to enforce German 
not only as the national language, which it of course is, but as the only language allowed to be 
spoken in households in Germany underscores the extent to which the dated assimilation model 
still holds sway in some political circles. Furthermore, media debates continue to frame Turks as 
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“unwilling to integrate.” There is resistance both on the part of the government and parts of the 
society to accept the reality of a multicultural state.  
While many people in society are tolerant of Turks (and refugees) in the abstract, 
successfully welcoming them into society requires more than mere tolerance. Extolling the long 
acknowledged “economic potential” of  the Turkish and other migrant communities (Aytar and 
Rath 2011, 1) is not enough to make people with a migration background feel welcome and 
accepted as equals. German policy must find ways to encourage Germans not to tolerate migrant 
populations based on their economic contributions or other criteria, but see them as their fellow 
Germans. Hinze writes, “The immigrant  can only become an integrated member of society if the 
general perception of the national mainstream is expanded to include the immigrant’s 
unchangeable features of difference, such as an as accent, a different sounding name, or a 
different skin color. Otherwise the immigrant will remain permanently excluded (2013, 22). 
This would admittedly require a fundamental transformation in longstanding definitions of 
Germanness as rooted in blood that still persist among a significant segment of the ethnically 
German population. While there is no quick or easy answer to the question of how this can be 
achieved, it is worth pointing out that the path toward a solution may demand doing less rather 
than more when it comes to top-down integration policies. As multicultural societies like Canada 
and the United States have shown, mutual acculturation processes usually happen over a long 
period of time and often without any specific integration policies in place. One possibility is 
promoting the study of Turkish as a foreign language by ethnic German students. While 
Integration Policy perhaps understandably places critical importance on immigrant populations 
learning to speak German, there has been little to no emphasis on the other direction: 
encouraging Germans to learn Turkish. While German gymnasiums students typically learn an 
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additional foreign language after English, currently there is only one bilingual German-Turkish 
school in Berlin despite its sizable Turkish population. Learning each other’s language could be 
an important first gesture of good will and a necessary early step on Germany’s long road toward 
a more inclusive national identity.  
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